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Abstract:  This study develops a framework to compare the ability of alternative earnings 
forecast approaches to capture the market expectation of future earnings. Given prior 
evidence of analysts’ systematic optimistic bias, we decompose earnings surprises into 
analysts’ earnings surprises and adjustments based on alternative forecasting models. An 
equal market response to these two components indicates that the associated earnings forecast 
is a sufficient estimate of the market expectation of future earnings. To apply our framework, 
we examine four recent regression-based earnings forecasting models, alongside a simple 
earnings-based random walk model and analysts’ forecasts. Using the earnings forecasts of 
the model that satisfies our sufficiency condition, we identify a set of stocks for which the 
market is unduly pessimistic about future earnings. The investment strategy of buying and 
holding these stocks generates statistically signiﬁcant abnormal returns. We offer an 
explanation as to why this and similar strategies might be successful. 
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1. Introduction 
Investors use a variety of sources of information to form their expectations of a ﬁrm’s future 
earnings and stock returns. Undoubtedly one of the more inﬂuential sources is analysts’ 
reports. Analysts have access to a wider variety of information than most investors, including 
personal contacts with senior executives of companies. Nonetheless, or perhaps because of 
these contacts, their one-year-ahead forecasts are known to have a systematic optimistic bias. 
Although regression-based models use a much more restricted information set, their 
proponents argue that their more objective and rigorous treatment of information is likely to 
lead to a more reliable forecast of earnings. There is no consensus on what is the best proxy 
for the market expectation of future earnings. 
Our study focuses on providing a theoretical framework for identifying superior 
forecasting ability in a set of contrasting models. We apply our framework to six different 
forecasting models, including those made by analysts. The one-year-ahead forecasts of one of 
the models are found to be more informative than analysts’ forecasts about the market 
expectation of future earnings. We then exploit this superiority to implement an investment 
strategy that is shown to consistently generate signiﬁcant abnormal returns. 
Knowing the market expectation of future earnings is important for use in portfolio 
formation, implied cost of capital estimation and investors’ behaviour studies. However, 
owing to the unobservable nature of the market expectation, a generally accepted method is 
to study the earnings response coeﬃcient (ERC), which is the price reaction to errors in the 
earnings forecast (Ball and Brown 1968). Nevertheless, much of the work in this area has 
proceeded on an ad-hoc empirical basis using basic regression techniques without a 
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theoretical foundation.1 Although we also use a linear regression-based approach, we develop 
a theoretical framework by which the relative contribution of corrections to analysts’ forecast 
errors can be evaluated in terms of the correlation structure of errors in forecasts. Using this 
framework, we explore the relationship of unexpected returns to two measures of earnings 
surprise: analysts’ forecast errors and adjustments based on alternative forecasting models.2 
The equal earnings response coefficient of these two measures is evidence that the model-
based forecast alone provides a sufficient estimate of the market expectation of future 
earnings. 
To evaluate our new approach, we use four recent regression-based earnings 
forecasting models alongside a simple earnings-based random walk (RW) model and 
analysts’ forecasts. The regression-based models are (1) the Hou, van Dijk and Zang (HDZ) 
model (Hou et al. 2012); (2) the SO model (So 2013); (3) the Konchitchki, Lou, Sadka and 
Sadka (KLSS) model (Konchitchki, et al. 2013); and (4) the Harris and Wang (HW) model 
(Harris and Wang 2013). To predict future earnings, these models use different combinations 
of subsets of publicly available information, ranging from accounting information and market 
information to analysts’ forecasts.3 All the regression-based models are claimed to 
outperform analysts’ forecasts in terms of forecast accuracy and/or the ERC. Our analysis is 
primarily concerned with the relative merits of alternative one-year-ahead earnings forecast 
proxies since financial statements are announced on a yearly basis and accounting 
information-based models can therefore provide a forecast once a year at most. 
                                                          
1 Ohlson (1991) comments: ‘Another theoretical problem concerns the relevance of unexpected earnings as a 
variable explaining returns. This construct appears to have the status of a “folklore concept” with limited 
economic content’. 
2 The former error equals the deviation of analysts’ forecast from the actual reported earnings while the latter is 
the deviation of model-based forecasts from analysts’ forecast. 
3 The HDZ and SO models base their earnings forecasts purely on accounting information. The KLSS model 
uses both market information (past stock returns) and analysts’ forecasts. The HW model is adapted by Harris 
and Wang (2013) using the theoretical approach in Ashton and Wang (2013). This model uses both accounting 
and market information to predict future earnings. 
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We decompose earnings surprise proxies associated with these earnings forecasts into 
analysts’ forecast errors and adjustments based on alternative forecasting models. Regressing 
unexpected returns on these two components shows that only the KLSS model has an equal 
ERC for these two components, satisfying the condition laid out in our framework. It implies 
that the KLSS model is the superior proxy for the market expectation of one-year-ahead 
earnings. Further investigation reveals that this KLSS model is effectively an optimal 
combination of the two benchmarks – analysts’ forecasts of earnings and a RW model – 
against which regression-based forecasts have normally been separately evaluated. 
We examine the economic evidence for our ﬁndings by applying them to a strategy of 
portfolio formation. While analysts’ forecasts are the most forward looking, the deviations of 
the KLSS forecasts, a historical data-based model, from those of analysts reflect the expected 
market’s correction for analysts’ errors. A significant negative deviation might signal over-
adjustments and an unduly pessimistic forecast of one-year-ahead earnings. Thus, if this is 
true, buying and holding these stocks should generate statistically signiﬁcant abnormal 
returns. Hence, we implement a buy-and-hold policy for the stocks in the bottom 10% of the 
differences between earnings forecasts of the KLSS model and the consensus forecasts of 
analysts. The results show that this strategy, on average, generates statistically signiﬁcant 
positive abnormal returns of 3.4% for one-month buy-and-hold investments and 8.8% for 
one-year buy-and-hold investments.  
In summary, our paper contributes to the literature by developing a rigorous formal 
framework for comparing earnings forecasts of financial analysts and other models in terms 
of capturing the market expectation of future earnings. By understanding the statistical 
implication of observed values of ERC in terms of the correlation between forecast errors, we 
are able to identify a forecasting model, the KLSS model, which contains more information 
about one-year-ahead forecasts of market expectations than that of analysts. We show that 
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this forecast is effectively based on an adjusted combination of benchmarks against which 
regression-based forecasts have hitherto been measured. We exploit the information content 
of the KLSS forecast, which is additional to that of analysts, to produce a viable investment 
strategy. Finally, we offer a new explanation as to why one-year-ahead regression-based 
forecasting models may offer profitable investment strategies. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical 
analysis that guides our empirical investigations. Section 3 describes the model structure and 
data. Section 4 contains the empirical results, while section 5 describes an investment 
strategy based on these results. Section 6 concludes and outlines the implications of our 
study.  
2. Motivation and theoretical foundations for the value of information 
2.1. Motivation 
Earnings data are an important input for fundamental valuation and asset-allocation decisions 
(Hou et al. 2012). Accurate earnings forecasts help to improve the quality of these decisions 
while better estimates of the market expectations of accounting earnings are important for 
many reasons. First, they can be used in the context of investment analysis. If one is able to 
predict future reported earnings precisely and shows that these forecasts are different from 
the market’s expectation of future earnings embedded in price, it should be possible to 
generate excess returns. Second, the market expectations of future earnings are used in the 
estimation of implied cost of capital (e.g. Claus and Thomas 2001, Gebhardt et al. 2001, 
Easton and Monahan 2005), which is an important input for capital appraisal investment and 
financial budgeting decisions. Any estimation errors of the market earnings expectation will 
lead to inaccurate estimation of the implied cost of capital and suboptimal investment 
decisions. 
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While the forecast quality can be assessed based on forecast bias or accuracy (Foster 
1977, Fama and French 2000, 2006, Hou et al. 2012, So 2013), determining whether such a 
forecast contains valuable information about the market expectation of future earnings is 
more challenging because the market expectation is unobservable. A more generally accepted 
method is to examine the price reaction to errors in the earnings forecast (ERC). The 
implication is that the higher the ERC, the better the model is at capturing the market 
expectation of earnings (Beaver 1970, Fried and Givoly 1982, Brown et al. 1987a, O’Brien 
1988, Hou et al. 2012). 
Based on the ERC measure, early researchers found analysts’ forecasts outperformed 
the random walk and univariate time-series models (Brown and Rozeﬀ 1978, Fried and 
Givoly 1982, Brown et al. 1987a, b). Hence, they have been extensively used as a proxy for 
the market expectation of future earnings in the context of the estimation of earnings surprise 
(Brown et al. 1987a, Walther 1997) and the implied cost of capital (Claus and Thomas 2001, 
Gebhardt et al. 2001, Easton et al. 2002, Botosan and Plumlee 2005, Easton and Monahan 
2005). However, more recent literature has argued that analysts’ forecasts are less accurate 
than the simple RW model under some conditions (Bradshaw et al. 2012, Gerakos and 
Gramacy 2013) and regression-based models (such as Hou et al. 2012, So 2013). Analysts 
forecasts also contain both systematic forecast bias and prediction errors (Abarbanell and 
Bushee 1997, Frankel and Lee 1998, Bradshaw et al. 2001, Easton and Sommers 2007, 
Hughes et al. 2008, Dichev and Tang 2009, Bradshaw 2011, Bosquet et al. 2015).  
Given the possibly predictable nature of analysts’ forecast errors, investors might 
rationally seek to adjust analysts’ forecasts for their biases (Feldman et al. 2003). Hughes et 
al. (2008) and So (2013) estimate the predictable component of analysts’ errors as the 
diﬀerence between more accurate earnings forecasts and analysts’ forecasts. They argue that 
if the strategy of sorting ﬁrms by the predicted errors fails to generate abnormal returns, 
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investors know analysts’ errors. Hughes et al. (2008) ﬁnd that the market is able to predict 
analysts’ forecast errors, while So (2013) concludes that the market fails to do so and that the 
market still overweighs analysts’ forecasts. Other researchers (Hou et al. 2012, Harris and 
Wang 2013, Li and Mohanram 2014) claim that their regression-based forecasts outperform 
analysts’ forecasts in terms of capturing the market expectation of future earnings. 
Explanations for these controversial findings remain limited due to the lack of a solid 
theoretical foundation for model evaluation. We therefore develop a new approach to 
evaluate whether a model is a sufficient estimate of the market earnings expectation by 
exploring the relationship between the unanticipated earnings surprises based on analysts’ 
forecasts, and any adjustment that can be provided by additional information contained in 
regression-based forecasts. This is the subject of the discussion in the next section. 
2.2. Information measures and earnings response coefficients 
The random variables 
1
rep
tE  , 
m
tE , 
a
tE  and 
f
tE  represent the reported earnings at time 1t   for 
an individual firm, the market expectation of earnings at time t , the consensus analysts’ 
forecast at time t  and a forecast made by a regression model, respectively.4 We note that 
realizations of 
1
rep
tE  , 
a
tE  and 
f
tE  are observable but that the market expectation of earnings 
m
tE  is not strictly observable.
5 In the case where the market expectation of earnings ( m
tE ) is 
different from the actual reported earnings (
1
rep
te  ), we are likely to see a price reaction in 
response to the earnings surprises 1( )tES  , as shown in equation (1):
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1 1
rep m
t t tE e ES    .
                                                 (1) 
                                                          
4 Because all empirical work concerns the aggregate behaviour of the variable across firms, at this stage firm 
subscripts are omitted.  
5 
m
tE  is not strictly observable yet could be implicitly studied through the stock price reaction during earnings 
announcements. 
6 We adopt the usual mathematical convention that capitals denote random variables and the corresponding 
lower-case letters the realization of those variables. 
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We assume that 
m
tE  is a noisy proxy for 1
rep
te  and that the market expectation prior to 
the actual announcement of earnings is normally distributed about actual reported earnings. 
Similarly, forecasting models produce noisy information about future reported earnings. We 
can model these processes, as in equation (2):7 
 
( )
( )
rep m m
rep a a
rep f f
a f a f
E E
E E
E E
E E

 

  
  
   
  
    ,
 (2) 
where 
m , f  and a  denote error terms assumed normal with zero means and variances of 
2
m , 
2
f  and 
2
a , respectively, and where , ,ma mf af    denote the correlations between the 
respective error terms, while 0   represents a positive bias or optimism on the part of 
analysts. The assumption of zero means and normality of the model-based forecast errors 
justifies the regression process and will be evidenced in the empirical work that follows. The 
assumption of normality gives us a linear form from the relationship between the expected 
surprise ( )rep mE E  and observed values of 
repe , ae and fe :8 
 
1 2 1 2{ | ,  ,  } ( ) ( ) ( )
rep m rep a f rep a a fE E e e e e e e e          E , (3) 
where 1  and 2  are coefficients associated with analysts’ forecast errors and expected 
corrections for analysts’ forecast errors. Theoretical values of these coefficients are derived in 
Appendix A. 
We further assume that the price reaction during the earnings announcements, or 
unexpected return (UR), follows a mean variance model, with the expected one-year-ahead 
price response being subject to an uncertainty adjustment: 
                                                          
7 For reasons of clarity, at this stage time subscripts are omitted. 
8 The unitalicized, unsubscripted E followed by {} in equations (3) and (4) denotes the expectations operator. 
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1 0 1 2{ | ,  ,  } ( ) ( )
rep m rep a f rep a a fUR k E E e e e e e e e           E ,     (4) 
where 1k  is the pricing multiple, 1 1 1k    and 2 1 2k   . 
We expect this intercept (
0 ), which is a combination of a measure analysts’ 
optimism   in equation (3) and the price attached to uncertainty, to be positive. In this form, 
2  measures the relative information of the correction to analysts’ forecasts contained in the 
difference 
a fe e . Equation (4) can also be written as: 
 
0 1 2 2( )( ) ( )
rep a rep fUR e e e e         . (5) 
Here the ratio 1 2 2( ) :    denotes the relative contributions of analysts’ forecasts to 
the regression-based forecasts in predicting the market earnings surprise. Our theoretical 
modelling in Appendix A offers insights into the regression structure in terms of more 
familiar measures of forecasting performance. It also helps us to interpret the results of our 
empirical investigations when we use regression equations (4) and (5). The most important of 
these is the relationship between 1  and 2 , which are just pricing multiples of 1  and 2  in 
Appendix A:  
1 1
( )
1
ma mf
m
af
k
 
 


 

                                                         (6) 
2 1 2
( )
1
m mf ma af
af
k
   



 

                 (7)                    
1 2 1 2
( )
1
ma mf af m
af
k
   
 


  

.               (8)                                                  
If analysts’ forecasts are superior to most regression-based forecasts as measured by 
their correlation coefficients, then 0ma mf    and 0 1af  . This implies 
0ma mf af    , which in turn leads to 1 2 0   .  
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A positive value of 
2  implies that the regression-based model potentially contains 
useful forecasting information in addition to analysts’ one-year-ahead forecasts about likely 
future price reactions. The relative weight, 1 2 2( ) :   , or relative importance of the 
analysts’ forecast generated by equation (5), is a decreasing function of the accuracy of the 
regression forecast relative to that of analysts, where the accuracy of both is measured by 
their respective correlation coefficients ( ,ma mf  ) with the market. 
As proved in Appendix A, 1 2   implies that the regression-based forecast by itself 
is a sufficient statistic for analysts’ forecasts. In this case, the relative weight given to the 
analysts’ forecast in equation (5) is zero and the price reaction can be explained purely in 
terms of the error in the regression-based forecast. 
3. Model structure and data selection 
3.1. Model structure 
At time t , in order to predict earnings at time 1t  , we assume that all our investors who rely 
on regression-based models study the relation between earnings and its determinants from a 
restricted information set ( IS ), as in equation (9):  
 
1.
rep
t t te    β IS , (9) 
where rep
te  represents reported earnings at time t , 1tIS  is the information vector at time 
1,t     is the intercept and t  is the residual term. We use the estimated coefficients  ˆˆ , β  
applied to the information set tIS  to make a forecast 
f
te of next period’s earnings using the 
information available at time t: 
 ˆˆ .ft te   β IS . (10) 
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Earnings surprises (forecast errors) associated with one-year-ahead forecasts ( f
te ) are 
then estimated when actual reported earnings (
1
rep
te  ) are announced, as in equation (11): 
1 1
rep
t t t
fee es    .                                                      (11) 
We select four recent studies which use different combinations of the information set, 
including accounting information, market information and analysts’ forecasts, as detailed in 
Appendix B. Interestingly, three out of the four models claim to be better than analysts in 
terms of forecast accuracy and/or earnings response coefficients. This is despite the fact that 
they use publicly available accounting and finance information, which appears to be just a 
subset of what analysts use (Brown et al. 2015). We also investigate a random walk model 
without drift. As a benchmark against which the performance of the regression-based models 
is assessed, we use analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts from I/B/E/S. A comparison 
of analysts’ forecasts with the others should provide evidence of the degree to which different 
information sets predict market expectations of the future earnings. It also potentially 
provides evidence or otherwise of analysts’ competence, who are considered to be dominant 
information intermediaries in capital markets (Frankel et al. 2006). 
3.2. Data selection 
The sample includes all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ listed securities with a fiscal year-end 
of 31st December and sharecode 10/11 at the intersection of the CRSP monthly returns file, 
the COMPUSTAT fundamental annual file and the I/B/E/S consensus EPS forecast files from 
January 1983 to December 2015. We use Cusip8 to merge the two databases. The start date is 
chosen due to the low availability of analysts’ forecasts prior to 1983 and the sample period is 
similar to that of Hou et al. (2012) and Konchitchki et al. (2013). To mitigate the effect of 
outliers, earnings and other variables each year are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
We return to this issue later in this section. 
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We follow Konchitchki et al. (2013) and So (2013) in using only companies with 
December fiscal year-ends. Analysts’ forecasts are collected in April each year, allowing for 
a reporting lag of three months. This ensures that neither regression-based models nor 
analysts have an information advantage over the others, since information about these 
companies as well as analysts’ forecasts is announced at approximately the same time. 
Compared with that of Hou et al. (2012), our research design provides a better match between 
the return window and the horizon of the expected earnings measure, as well as aligning 
analysts’ forecast accuracy.9 Furthermore, as well documented, varying seasonal and investor 
sentiment affects stock price and excess returns are positively correlated with such shifts in 
sentiment (Rozeff and Kinney 1976, Lee et al. 2002). Hence, using only December year-end 
firms, whose earnings are announced during a similar period, allows us to isolate the impact 
of economic conditions and/or investor sentiment on the return-earnings regression. Because 
of this fiscal year-end requirement, our sample accounts for approximately 55% of the whole 
population. As a result, generalizability could be limited because December year-end firms 
are typically larger than non-December year-end firms and associated with different levels of 
price reaction (Smith and Pourciau 1988, Bamber et al. 2000). 
Table 1 shows the number of firm-year observations for each model at every stage, 
including the sample used, earnings forecasts, earnings forecasts after merging with other 
models, scaling and matching with annualized abnormal stock returns. The regression-based 
models, HDZ and HW, unsurprisingly have greater coverage than analysts. The KLSS model 
has the poorest coverage since it requires a minimum of two consecutive years of actual EPS 
                                                          
9 Hou et al. (2012) generate forecasts at end of June for all firms with different fiscal year-ends and compare 
these with the latest analysts’ forecast. Hence, for firms with a fiscal year-end of July, their forecasts and 
analysts’ forecast are just a month away from the actual earnings announcement, yet they are then matched with 
annualized abnormal returns for model valuations. Their results are subject to this mismatch between the return 
window and the horizon of the earnings surprise measure. In our study, forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings are 
generated in April, so are approximately a year from the next annual earnings announcements. Earnings 
surprises associated with these forecasts are then matched to annualized abnormal returns at the model-valuation 
stage. 
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data together with the corresponding analysts’ forecast. We obtain a sample of 27,903 firm-
year observations, which contains observations that are available across models and abnormal 
stock returns. Nevertheless, while analysts aim to forecast the actual I/B/E/S earnings, the 
statistical comparison with regression-based modellers is based on winsorized values, placing 
an unfair disadvantage on analysts. Hence, the sample is later reduced to 26,506 when 
observations with winzorized earnings are removed to provide a level playing field for 
analysts’ and model-based earnings forecasts. The need for a common dataset probably 
results in a concentration of larger companies with established analyst coverage. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Table 2 presents summary time-series average statistics of the variables used in the 
cross-sectional regression earnings models for the period 1983–2015. Note the differences in 
the units of measurement. Panel A describes statistics of the HDZ model where earnings, 
total assets, dividends and accruals are unscaled factors. Compared with the values in Hou et 
al. (2012), the means of earnings and total assets are higher, probably due to the shorter 
sample period. The summary statistics in Panel B are different from those in Harris and Wang 
(2013) due to more censoring of the data, omitting observations with extreme accounting 
values, removing firms with negative book values and penny stocks. The summary statistics 
associated with the KLSS model in Panel C are similar to those reported in Konchitchki et al. 
(2013). Panel D presents statistics of variables used in the SO model.10 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
3.3. Cross-sectional earnings regression 
                                                          
10 Hou et al. 2012 (who use all firms with a sample period from 1968 to 2008) have a mean income before 
extraordinary items (IB) of $49.07m and mean total assets (AT) of $1529.78m. Konchitchi et al. 2013, who use 
December-fiscal-year-end firms with a similar sample period (1985–2010), have a mean change in EPS deflated 
by stock price (CIB) of 0.003, a mean lagged one-year return (RET) of 0.194, and a mean analysts’ forecast of 
changes in EPS deflated by stock price (CAF) of 0.019. Harris and Wang (2013) (1963–2011) report a mean 
earnings per share (IBPS) of $0.685, a mean book value per share (B) of $9.105, and a mean adjusted stock 
price (APRC) of $13.51. So (2012) does not present summary statistics. 
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To establish the relationship between earnings at time t  and the information set at time 1t  , 
as in equation (9), we estimate the predictor coefficients of regression-based models and 
present the results in Table 3. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
In Panel A our results are similar to the findings of Hou et al. (2012), with future 
earnings being significantly positively correlated with total assets, dividend and lagged one-
year earnings. We note that the average coefficient of lagged one-year earnings is highly 
significant, confirming the findings of Fama and French (2006) and Hou et al. (2012) that 
earnings are highly persistent and form the basis of most forecasts. Panel B shows the 
statistics of the HW model, which are in line with the results reported in Harris and Wang 
(2013).  
Panel C presents the statistics of the KLSS model. These show that both changes in 
earnings analysts’ forecasts and lagged one-year returns are positively and significantly 
correlated to the actual changes in report earnings. Interestingly, the adjusted- 2R  obtained 
from this regression is much lower than that of the HDZ model. However, this is not material 
because the KLSS model is based on changes in earnings as opposed to the level of earnings. 
Finally, Panel D presents the statistics of the SO model. The explanatory power of the 
extended set of predictors (adjusted- 2R ) is also lower than that of the HDZ model, but again 
it would be wrong to attach too much significance to the adjusted- 2R  because So (2013) is 
forecasting a different measure of earnings – an issue that we will have to deal with when we 
try to make comparisons between the competing models. 
4. The forecasting models compared 
4.1. Forecast bias of models 
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We next compute forecasts for each regression model by multiplying the estimated 
coefficients by the predictors at time t  to generate earnings estimates for time 1t  , as in 
equation (10). Earnings surprises are defined as actual reported earnings minus the forecasts, 
as in equation (11). We noted in Section 3 that our models aim to predict three different 
measures of earnings. The HDZ model predicts non-scaled earnings, while analysts and the 
SO and RW models predict EPS, and the KLSS model forecasts the future EPS/price ratio. 
To ensure the comparability of the models, we scale the different earnings surprises to 
produce a common measurement basis in the form of forward earnings yield (EPS/price).11  
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of these earnings surprise proxies. Panel A 
compares the earnings surprises of alternative one-year-ahead earnings forecasts. The sizes 
and signs of the earnings surprises are indicative of any bias in the different earnings 
forecasts. As expected, by their construction, none of the regression-based models display 
statistically significant bias. In line with the literature, we observe a significant negative error 
in the forecasts made by analysts, indicating optimism. We should also remember that for 
comparability with our regression models, this statistic is for the earliest forecasts of analysts, 
which accounts for the relatively high degree of optimism (Ciciretti et al. 2009). 
Nevertheless, they are more accurate than forecasts of the RW, HDZ, HW and SO models 
based on the absolute earnings surprise (AES) statistics. Interestingly, there is no significant 
difference between the accuracy of the analysts’ forecasts and the KLSS model. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
Nevertheless, like most previous studies, we have winsorized our data at the 1% level. 
Thus, we have effectively replaced ‘unacceptable’ actual reported earnings with a figure that 
                                                          
11 The earnings surprises in the HDZ model are scaled by market capitalization, while those in the AF, RW, HW 
and SO models are scaled by adjusted stock prices to produce earnings surprises in the form of forward earnings 
yields. Since the KLSS model predicts changes in earnings per share deflated by price, there is no need to 
further scale earnings at this stage. 
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we regard as more acceptable for the fitting of the regression model. This puts analysts, who 
are allowed no such discretion, at a disadvantage in terms of forecast accuracy. We thus 
eliminate winsorized reported earnings data and run our subsequent analysis on the slightly 
reduced sample (Panel B). We find that in terms of accuracy as measured by the mean 
absolute deviation, analysts’ forecasts are the most accurate.12 This superiority is statistically 
significant (Panel C).13 In addition, the variability in the absolute error of analysts’ forecasts 
is the least. Among regression-based models, the KLSS model, which uses analysts’ 
forecasts, past-year earnings and past-year stock return, outperforms the rest in terms of 
forecast accuracy. 
In Panel D, we report the time-series average correlation of alternative proxies of 
earnings surprises. The correlations between all the models is positive. In general, the 
correlation coefficient reflects the degree of communality of the input dataset, with that of the 
KLSS model and analysts’ forecasts being the highest. The KLSS model also has a high 
degree of correlation with the RW model. We will explore the implications of these 
observations in more depth in Section 5.2. The lower degree of correlation between analysts’ 
forecasts with the regression models based purely on accounting values (HDZ, HW and SO) 
is a likely reflection of the fact that analysts also make extensive use of non-accounting 
information to form their predictions. 
4.2. Earnings response coefficients and the preliminary result of the information theory 
Our primary interest is the prediction of future price movements in response to errors in 
forecasts of earnings. Hence, we measure the earnings response coefficient (ERC), which 
reflects the stock market reaction for one unit of unexpected earnings by scaling all forecast 
                                                          
12 The AESs in analysts’ forecast reported are further disadvantaged by the ‘optimism’ of 0.0146 in Table 4. The 
triangle inequality implies that the absolute deviation is between the reported figure 0.0297 and 0.0151 (= 
0.0297–0.0146) in the absence of such bias. In addition, the high value of the t-statistics suggests less variation 
in the absolute deviation than in the other measures. 
13 A negative entry in a column implies that the column variable has a lower absolute error, while a positive 
entry in a row implies that the row variable has a lower absolute error. 
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surprises by the standard deviation of surprises, using regression equation (12).14 This 
structure emphasizes that ERCs vary across firms ( j ) and over time: 
 
, 1 , 1 1,( ) 0, 1
rep f
j t j t j t
f
ta ERACAR e t TC e u     , (12) 
where 
, 1j tACAR   denotes annualized cumulative abnormal return which equals the sum of 
four quarterly earnings announcement abnormal returns (market adjusted, from day –1 to day 
1).15 
Table 5 presents the ERCs and their corresponding average t-statistics associated with 
each proxy of earnings surprises (Panel A), and a comparison between them (Panel B) 
obtained from the Fama–Macbeth two-stage regressions with Newey–West adjusted standard 
errors. The results in Panel A show that all the response coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant, with the ERCs of KLSS and analysts’ forecasts being the highest. The 
adjusted- 2R  statistics are relatively low since we are predicting an ‘earnings surprise’ one 
year before it happens, and the relative uncertainty remaining in all the one-year-ahead 
forecasts is substantial. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
Panel B of Table 5 shows the differences between ERC estimates together with their 
corresponding t-statistics. We find that the ERCs of the KLSS model and analysts’ forecasts 
are statistically indifferent yet they are statistically significantly higher than all the others. 
These are the best-performing models in terms of capturing the market expectation of future 
earnings. We also note in general the pivotal role of analysts’ forecasts in forming market 
expectations, where it too dominates all the other models except for the KLSS model.  
                                                          
14 Different models predict different measures of earnings, which prevents an easy comparison of ERCs. Hence, 
to enable a direct comparison, we follow Brown et al. (1987a) and Hou et al. (2012) by standardizing all proxies 
for earnings surprises each year to achieve unit variance. This has the added advantage in our case of making the 
resulting coefficients directly interpretable in terms of the theory developed in Section 2. 
15 We adopt the approach used by Hou et al. (2012) to estimate the unexpected returns (UR) in equations (4) and 
(5), which we refer to as
, 1j tACAR   in equation (12). 
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We check the robustness of our findings by adding the contemporaneous values of 
control variables, which are used in the literature as the determinants of earnings response 
coefficients, into the return-earnings regression (Table 6). The control variable set includes 
the firms’ beta (Collins and Kothari 1989, Zolotoy 2012), dividend pay-out ratio (Kallapur 
1994, Mande 1994), leverage ratio, market-to-book ratio (MB) (Collins and Kothari 1989, 
Zolotoy 2012), negative earnings dummy and non-dividend paying dummy (Hayn 1995), 
earnings volatility (Dichev and Tang 2009), accrual quality (Perotti and Wagenhofer 2014) 
and the number of analysts’ forecasts (Bartov et al. 1999). 
We find that the changes in the numerical values of the ERCs of all the models are 
relatively minor. The ERC of the KLSS model remains the highest (from Panel A). Further 
tests, which are shown in Panel B of Table 6, indicate that it is statistically higher than those 
of the other forecasts, including analysts’ forecasts. This confirms the robustness of earlier 
results. However, as we have shown in our theoretical framework, we still need to explore the 
relative contribution of modellers’ forecasts in providing additional information about market 
expectations. We address this in the next section. 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
4.3. Earnings surprise decomposition and the value of information 
So far, we have investigated the properties of the forecasts in isolation. In general, we find 
that analysts’ forecasts perform well in terms of forecast accuracy but present a systematic 
upward bias. Hence, to compare the relative merits of regression-based forecasts with those 
of analysts to ascertain whether predictable adjustments to analysts’ forecasts exist, we 
decompose market earnings surprise into the two components outlined in Section 2 and 
perform the following regressions:  
 
0 1 , 1 , 2, 11 , ,( ) ( ) u 0, 1
rep a a
j t
f
j t j t j t j t te e e e t TACAR              , (13) 
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where T  is the number of years in our sample, , 1 ,
rep a
j t j te e   is the earnings surprise using 
analysts’ one-year-ahead forecasts and 
, ,
a f
j t j te e  is a measure of additional information 
contained in the regression model (i.e. the market’s correction for analysts’ forecast errors). 
Again, we report only aggregate time-series average values obtained from Fama–Macbeth 
two-stage regressions with Newey–West adjusted standard errors. 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
Table 7 presents the time-series average of the earnings response coefficients 
associated with the earnings surprise arising from analysts’ forecasts and adjustments for 
each of the models. We note that 1 2   is in line with our hypothesis in Section 2. We also 
note that the addition of the term 
, 1 ,
rep f
j t j te e   increases the explanatory power over that of 
analysts’ forecasts alone. This suggests that all the ‘mechanical’ models including the RW 
contain additional information and provide corrections for the predictable component of the 
errors in the one-year-ahead analysts’ forecasts (Hughes et al. 2008). 
We rewrite equation (13) in the following form: 
        
0 1 2 , 1 , 2 , 1, ,1 1( )( ) ( ) u 0, 1
rep a rep f
j t j t j t jj t ttACAR e e e e t T             .      (14) 
As discussed in Section 2.2, in this form the significance of the difference 1 2   can 
be interpreted as a measure of the contribution of the analysts’ forecast to the joint 
combination of forecasts, while the ratio 1 2 2( ) :    is an indication of the relative weights 
to be attached to the two forecasts. First, we observe that the differences ( 1 2  ) associated 
with the HDZ, SO, HW and RW models are all greater than 0.022 and that these differences 
are statistically significant. In contrast, that of the forecast produced by the KLSS model is 
much smaller (0.0025) and is not statistically significant, implying that analysts’ forecasts 
carry no additional information to that already incorporated into the KLSS forecast. We also 
20 
 
note that the relative weights as measured by the ratio 1 2 2( ) :    to attach to the KLSS 
forecasts is of the order of 13 times that of the analysts’ forecasts, whereas for all the other 
models the analysts’ forecasts carry a weight greater than unity.16 This confirms that the 
KLSS model is a better forecast of the market expectation of earnings expectations.  
Finally, we conduct robustness checks by adding control variables in the return-
earnings regression and present the time-series averages of its coefficients in Table 8. The 
relative performance of the models as measured by 1  and 2  remains largely unchanged, 
with the KLSS model being superior. 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
5. Portfolio formation 
5.1. Investment strategy 
A principal reason for trying to get a better forecast of the market expectation of future 
earnings is to identify a strategy upon which we can construct a profitable investment 
portfolio.17 In our case, we are dealing with one-year-ahead forecasts. If a subset of one-year-
ahead forecasts proves to be overly pessimistic then we are likely to see an initial fall in 
value. Once actual earnings figures, which we assume will be higher than market 
expectations, are announced, stock prices are likely to respond positively. Hence, buying and 
holding stocks in this ‘overly pessimistic’ subset should prove a profitable investment 
strategy. On the other hand, for the subset of overoptimistic forecasts, overvaluation occurs – 
that is, buying and holding stocks in this subset leads to losses. The practical problem of these 
strategies is that the market expectation of future earnings is unobservable so the 
                                                          
16 On checking, the correlation coefficients in Tables 7 and 8 and the observed values of the weights are found 
to be consistent with their theoretical relationships established in Appendix A (equation (A.7)). 
17 Our approach is distinct from that of So (2013) since we base our investment strategy on a proxy of expected 
market adjustment for analysts’ forecast errors and mispredictions. 
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determination of whether particular forecasts are overly pessimistic is not immediately 
obvious.  
The empirical results in Section 4 strongly suggest that earnings forecasts of the 
KLSS model are the best estimates of the market’s expectation of one-year-ahead earnings 
while analysts’ forecasts perform best in terms of forecast accuracy. We thus examine the 
difference between forecasts of the KLSS model (
,
KLSS
j te ) and analysts ( ,
a
j te ). If , ,
KLSS a
j t j te e , 
there is the possibility that the KLSS model or the market over-adjusts for those specific 
firms and produces an unduly pessimistic forecast, resulting in a series of positive earnings 
surprises. We therefore examine the excess abnormal returns (EACAR) associated with 
differences in model-based forecasts and analysts’ earnings forecast differences 
, ,( )
KLSS a
j t j te e  
(Table 9 and Figure 1). Here EACAR equals annualized cumulative abnormal returns (ACAR) 
minus the mean of annualized cumulative abnormal returns (𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). We observe positive 
(negative) excess returns for the low (high) subset. This aligns with our prediction of a 
negative correlation between EACAR and the differences 
, ,( )
KLSS a
j t j te e . One possible 
explanation of this phenomenon of the difference in predictions between the one-year-ahead 
analysts’ forecasts and the forecasts of the KLSS model is that the market takes more notice 
of the recent poor performance, which is captured in the KLSS model in preference to what is 
perceived to be new overly optimistic analysts’ forecasts. Thus, at this early stage in the 
forecasting cycle, there is perhaps a degree of anchoring by the market (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974, Shefrin 2000, Campbell and Sharpe 2009). 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
In the next section, we simulate and evaluate the performance of an investment 
strategy of buying and holding stocks in the low (high) earnings forecast difference subsets. 
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5.2. Portfolio performance 
We examine more formally an investment strategy that exploits the difference between the 
KLSS forecasts and analysts’ forecasts. On 1st May each year, when all data and earnings 
forecasts are available for each year between 1985 and 2014, we first eliminate stocks in the 
top and bottom 1% of the earnings forecast differences to avoid picking up outliers. We then 
construct two buy-and-hold portfolios based on the differences in earnings forecasts of the 
KLSS model and those of analysts. One portfolio is formed from stocks in the lowest 10% 
(the low portfolio) and the other is formed from stocks in the highest 10% (the high 
portfolio).  
We calculate buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) having adjusted for risks, as 
suggested by Fama (1998), using both the market model and the Fama–French five-factor 
model (Fama and French, 2015) with various holding periods ranging from a month to a year. 
Since we form an equally weighted portfolio, we use the equally weighted CRSP portfolio as 
a proxy for the market portfolio.  
Panel A of Table 10 presents abnormal returns of the low portfolio where earnings 
forecasts of the KLSS model are significantly lower than those of analysts. We find that more 
than 70% of the time we get positive abnormal returns, and the mean of BHARs are also 
significantly positive regardless of the holding period. They are 3.8%, 8.3%, 11.7% and 
13.8% for one-, three-, six- and twelve-month investments, respectively, if we use the market 
model (Panel A), ignoring transaction costs. If we use the Fama–French five-factor model, 
the corresponding results are 3.4%, 7.2%, 9.2% and 8.8%.18 All are statistically significant. 
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
                                                          
18 When we apply the Fama–French (1993) three-factor model, the corresponding results are 3.7%, 7.9%, 10.9% 
and 12.36%. 
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As a further test of our model and theoretical explanation, we adopt the contra 
strategy of buying those shares where the forecasts of earnings produced by the KLSS are 
much higher than those of analysts – that is, , ,
KLSS a
j t j te e (Panel B). As expected, here the 
earnings forecasts of the KLSS model are optimistic and the portfolio is subject to a series of 
negative earnings surprises. Losses occur in more than 93% of the years between 1985 and 
2014. 
If we examine the pattern of the excess returns, we notice that most of the gains in 
Table 10 Panel A are realized in a six-month holding period. These results are consistent with 
the explanation of a degree of anchoring suggested earlier in Section 5.1, whereby more 
weight is given to recent poor performance in the pessimistic set than to revised optimism by 
analysts. By the time the half-yearly results are announced, most of this early pessimism has 
been replaced by a more realistic view of the firm’s performance. The reverse is true in the 
case of Table 10, Panel B, where poor performance is confirmed by the half-year stage and 
losses occur in the next six months of trading. This analysis confirms the greater ability of 
earnings forecast of the KLSS model to capture market sentiment in the form of expectations 
of one-year-ahead earnings, but equally does not deny the greater accuracy of analysts’ 
forecasts. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we develop a theoretical framework for comparing the information content of 
alternative earnings forecasts in terms of the correlation coefficients between errors in 
forecasts of market expectations. We establish conditions under which a forecast proxy 
dominates that of analysts and provides a sufficient estimate of the market expectation of 
future earnings. Based on the theory, we explore the information content of forecasts made by 
analysts and compare these with the RW model and four differently constructed regression-
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based approaches. We introduce a level playing field by removing any winsorized data, 
which is typically adjusted prior to regression analysis being carried out. We investigate the 
various forecasts in terms of forecast bias over actual reported earnings and the alignment to 
market expectation of future earnings.  
We confirm that although analysts’ forecasts are upwardly biased over actual reported 
earnings, in general within our subset of observations they are more accurate than other firm-
characteristic regression-based models (the HDZ, HW and SO models). Meanwhile, the 
forecasts from the KLSS model, which in effect combines analysts’ forecasts with lagged 
one-year-return adjustment, are less biased and have a higher earnings response coefficient. 
However, we also draw attention to the limitation of this and other studies. In our case, the 
need for a common dataset probably results in a concentration of larger companies with an 
established following of analysts. This does not deny the possibility that other regression 
models covering a greater number of smaller companies with a thinner analyst following 
could be found to outperform the one-year-ahead analysts’ forecasts. 
 Finally, we conclude that within our dataset consisting of larger companies, the 
KLSS model still contains information additional to analysts’ one-year-ahead forecasts. By 
concentrating on the most pessimistic subset, we can identify portfolios that outperform the 
market on a risk-adjusted basis. Further consideration of our results strongly suggests that the 
market initially forms its expectation based on recent performance, which forms part of the 
basis of the KLSS model. An application of this idea using US data from 1983 to 2015 
suggests the existence of a profitable and exploitable investment strategy. We attribute this 
apparent violation of market efficiency to the market overweighting recent poor performance. 
Our research draws attention to the importance of a theoretical framework that 
facilitates the understanding and interpretation of various empirical results. This analysis adds 
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structure to the large literature on the superiority of various forecasting models. In our case, 
the statistical analysis of the underlying determinants of the earnings response coefficient 
provides the basis for comparing competing models used in forecasting earnings. Such 
models form the basis of equity valuation. It also provides a framework that helps understand 
how mechanistic forecasting models might outperform analysts’ forecasts when analysts have 
access to sophisticated forecasting models, alongside superior private information. We argue 
that one answer lies in the market overweighting, or anchoring on, recent poor performance. 
We show how this observation can be exploited using a mechanistic selection technique that 
is not prone to such biases. This latter observation presents a rich vein for investment 
practitioners to explore and understand other similar contrarian strategies.   
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Appendix A: Decomposition of the maximum likelihood function of the market earnings 
surprises 
As discussed in Section 2, we have the forecasting system following equation (2): 
rep m
m
rep a
a
rep f
f
a f
a f
E E
E E
E E
E E

 

  
  
   
  
   
.
 
Applying standard techniques for multivariate analysis from Press (1972 p. 69), we 
can deduce the theoretical values of the coefficients in equation (3) in terms of the variances 
and covariance of , ,m a f   . 
The maximum likelihood of the market earnings surprise given observed analysts’ 
surprise and model-based surprise is as follows: 
E
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    
(A.1) 
where E{.} is the expectations operator, covariance matrices: 
12 cov( , ) cov( , )m a m a f            
 
1
1
22 22
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cov( , ) var( )
a f a a f
a a f a
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   


  
    
  
and the variance term 2 1
11.2 12 22 21( )
m       .                                                           (A.2) 
In practice, we standardize the observed values andrep a a fe e e e  to have unit 
variance. If we do the same to the theoretical values, this simplification has the effect of 
simplifying the algebra. We have:  
12 )ma m ma m mf m            and 
1
1
22 22
2(1 ) 1
det
1 1
af af
af
 



  
    
,     (A.3)  
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where 
1
22 2
1
det
1 af

 

, ,ma mf   and af  denote the correlation coefficient between 
and ,  m a m    and ,  and f a f   , respectively.  
By multiplying the matrices out in equation (A.1), we get the coefficients in equation 
(3) in Section 2 as follows: 
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.                                                     (A.6) 
This gives us a theoretical value for the relative weights in equation (3) as: 
1 2 2( ) : ( ) : ( )ma mf af mf ma af            .              (A.7) 
We now consider the cases where the forecast produced by the regression model 
forecasts is a sufficient statistic for the analysts’ forecast. We assume that 
a f    , where 
  is white noise 2(0, )N  , and temporarily suspend the unit variance assumption a  and f . 
Here analysts’ forecasts are just a noisy version of the model’s forecast.  
Thus, cov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , )cov( , ) 0m f m a f f a f               
              cov( , ) cov( , )m a ma m a m f mf m f               
and 2cov( , ) cov( , )a a f a f            .                                   (A.8) 
Hence,  12 0 0ma m a mf m f           , 
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which is just the regression coefficient of e
rep me   on erep fe  .   
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Appendix B: Variables’ descriptions and information sets 
Panel A: CRSP/COMPUSTAT items   
Item Description 
 
Item Description 
AT Total assets 
 
TXP Income taxes payable 
DVC Total dividends 
 
IB Income before extraordinary items 
CSHO Common shares outstanding 
 
SPI Special items 
DP Depreciation and amortization 
 
CEQ Total common/ordinary equity 
ACT Total current assets 
 
CHE Cash and short-term investment 
LCT Total current liabilities 
 
OANCF Operating activities net cash flow 
DLC Total debt in current liabilities   TCAP Market capitalization 
Panel B: Information set (ISt) of regression-based models 
HDZ model 
 
Dependent variable: (IB) Net income before extraordinary items. 
IBt, ATt, DVCt As above. 
DD1t Indicator for dividend payer, which is one if dividends are positive and zero otherwise. 
NEGt Negative earnings indicator, which is one if earnings are negative and zero otherwise. 
ACRt Prior to 1988, accruals are the change in non-cash current assets less change in current 
liabilities, excluding the change in short-term debt and the change in taxes payable minus 
depreciation and amortization expenses. Since 1988, accruals equal the difference between 
earnings and cash flows from operations. 
HW model Dependent variable: (IBPS) net income before extraordinary items deflated by adjusted 
number of shares outstanding. 
IBPSt Income before extraordinary items deflated by adjusted number of shares outstanding 
Bt, Bt–1 Book value per share: book value deflated by adjusted number of shares outstanding. 
APRCt, 
APRCt–1 
Adjusted stock price three months after the fiscal year-end (end of March). 
KLSS 
model 
Dependent variable: (CIB) Actual change in earnings measured as changes in I/B/E/S EPS 
deflated by stock price. 
RETt Lagged one-year compound returns from 1 April last year to 1 April this year. 
CAFt Change in earnings forecasted by analysts, which is the analysts’ median consensus forecast 
for the current period minus the previous period’s earnings. 
SO model Dependent variable: (IBTS) Net income before extraordinary items and after subtracting 
special items and taxes deflated by adjusted number of shares outstanding.19 
IBTPt Positive EPS, which equals EPS if they are positive and zero otherwise 
NEGEt Negative earnings indicator, which is one if earnings are negative and zero otherwise. 
ACPt Positive accruals equal accruals per share when accruals are positive and zero otherwise.20 
ACNt Negative accruals equal accruals per share when accruals are negative and zero otherwise. 
AGt Asset growth – percentage. 
DD2t Indicator for non-dividend payer, one when firms do not pay dividend, and zero otherwise. 
DIVt Dividends per share equal dividends for common equity divided by the number of shares. 
BMt Book-to-market ratios equal common equity divided by market capitalization. 
APRCt Adjusted stock price at fiscal year-end (end of December). 
 
                                                          
19 This is to make the earnings figure from COMPUSTAT compatible with the I/B/E/S earnings per share 
(Bradshaw and Sloan 2002). The tax rate is assumed to be 35%. 
20 The accruals equal the change in current assets plus the change in debt in current liabilities minus the change 
in cash and short-term investments and minus the change in current liabilities. 
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Appendix B: Variables’ descriptions and information sets (Cont.) 
Other Variables 
Beta Downloaded from WRDS/CRSP dated 11 July 2016. 
DPR Dividend pay-out ratios equal dividends divided by earnings before extraordinary items. 
LEV Leverage ratios which equal long-term debt divided by the market value of assets. 
MB Market-to-book ratios equal market capitalization divided by total common equity. 
E_vol Earnings volatility equals standard deviation of deflated earnings (total earnings/average 
total assets) of the last five years (minimum of three-year requirement). 
DA Discretionary accruals estimated the approach in Jones (1991). 
NEAF Number of analysts’ forecasts from I/B/E/S. 
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Figure 1: The relationship between abnormal returns and differences in earnings forecasts 
 
 
Annualized cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) plotted against the difference in forecast future earnings scaled by stock price between those made by the 
KLSS model ( )KLSSe  and analysts (
ae ). The data consists of 26,500 individual observations across all years ranked on the differences, with each data point 
representing the average values of portfolios of size 265. 
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Table 1: Data and number of observations 
This presents the number of observations at each stage of our forecasting and evaluation exercise. 
Data scope December fiscal year-end firms with sharecode 10/11a   
Time 1983–2015 for accounting data and 1983–2015 for stock data file 
 Model Totalb (1)c (2)d (3)e (4)f (5)g 
AF 59442 59442 
29469 
27906 27903 26506 
RW 63651 63651 
HDZ 97283 84271 
HW 81189 79270 
KLSS 52981 47907 
SO 73825 61679 
ACAR       
 
 
  
                                                          
a Firms in NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX stock exchanges. 
b To ensure the matching window between returns and earnings surprises and align firms’ business nature, our 
study uses only firms with December fiscal year-end and sharecode 10/11 (excluding ADRs, close-end funds 
and REITS), which account for about 55% of the whole population. 
c Earnings forecasts: to generate earnings forecasts, we need information available for at least two consecutive 
years (for the case of the HDZ, SO and KLSS models) or three consecutive years (for the case of the HW 
model). This reduces the number of firm-year observations of earnings forecasts. 
d Number of earnings forecast observations available for all models. 
e Scaling earnings surprises: earnings surprises in year 1t   are scaled by adjusted share prices in March of year 
t for the case of the AF, RW, HW and SO models and by market capitalization in March of year t for the case of 
the HDZ model. The absence of price information causes a slight fall in the number of firm-year observations. 
f Matching earnings surprise return: returns (ACAR) are the annualized cumulative abnormal returns of four 
quarterly earnings announcements that are market adjusted from day –1 to day +1. We require firms to have 
non-missing price information for those days. In addition, there are cases where the earnings forecast is 
available while the actual reported earnings are missing. The absence of price information or of the actual 
reported earnings for some firms in some years causes a fall in the number of observations when we match 
earnings surprises with the returns. 
g Excluding winsorized earnings for a fair forecast accuracy comparison. 
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Table 2: Summary statistics of the variables in the cross-sectional earnings models (1983–2014) 
This provides summary time-series average statistics (mean, median, standard deviation and selected 
percentiles) of the variables used in the regression-based models. 
  Description Mean P1 Median P99 SD 
Panel A: Variables in HDZ model (Hou et al. 2012) 
IB Income before extraordinary items 
($m) 
86.1 –400.7 5.2 2232.6 335.7 
AT Total assets ($m) 3077.2 3.9 348.7 62830.7 9176.6 
DVC Total dividends ($m) 32.55 0.00 0.03 768.14 114.28 
DD1 Indicator for dividend payer 0.38 0.00 0.09 1.00 0.48 
NEG Negative earnings indicator 0.34 0.00 0.03 1.00 0.47 
ACR Accruals ($m) –114.6 –2318.7 –10.3 207.3 354.2 
Number of observations: 97283     
Panel B: Variables in HW model (Harris and Wang 2013) 
IBPS EPS ($) 0.30 –17.81 0.48 7.64 3.08 
B Book value per share ($) 10.36 –3.97 6.55 89.99 14.07 
APRC Adjusted stock price (end March) ($) 19.45 0.73 12.46 169.82 25.68 
Number of observations: 81189     
Panel C: Variables in KLSS model (Konchitchki et al. 2013) 
CIB Actual change in EPS deflated by 
stock prices 
0.004 –0.380 0.006 0.455 0.094 
RET Lagged one-year returns 0.197 –0.636 0.106 2.291 0.614 
CAF Change in EPS forecasted by 
analysts 
0.024 –0.120 0.009 0.487 0.074 
Number of observations: 52981     
Panel D: Variables in SO model (So 2013) 
IBTS EPS adjusted for special items ($) 0.22 –8.51 0.25 4.29 1.54 
IBTP Positive EPS ($) 0.56 0.00 0.25 4.29 0.80 
NEGE Negative earnings indicator ($) 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.47 
ACP Positive accruals per share ($) 0.42 0.00 0.03 6.55 0.98 
ACN Negative accruals per share ($) 0.37 0.00 0.01 7.04 1.01 
AG Asset growth – percentage 7.57 –67.38 3.84 178.27 34.72 
DD2 Indicator for non-dividend payer 0.66 0.00 0.91 1.00 0.46 
DIV Dividends per share ($) 0.21 0.00 0.00 2.41 0.45 
BM Book-to-market ratio 0.60 –1.90 0.51 3.37 0.66 
APRC Adjusted stock price (end 
December) ($) 
17.94 0.37 11.19 152.64 22.52 
Number of observations: 73825         
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Table 3: Earnings regression coefficients (1984–2014) 
This presents the time-series average coefficients and their t-statistics from cross-sectional regression 
of earnings (
rep
te ) on the lagged-one-year of information set ( , 1j tIS ): 1
rep
t t te     β IS . 
Detailed descriptions of dependent and independent variables are shown in Appendix B. 
Panel A: Earnings regressions using HDZ model 
Variables Description 
Average 
coefficient T-statistic 
IB Income before extraordinary items 0.721 (26.22) 
AT Total assets 0.003 (2.50) 
DVC Total dividends 0.363 (7.43) 
DD1 Indicator for dividend payer –0.542 (–0.24) 
NEG Negative earnings indicator 1.923 (0.87) 
ACR Accruals –0.079 (–4.40) 
Intercept 
 
–3.618 (–2.99) 
Adj. R2 
 
0.785 
 Panel B: Earnings regressions using HW model 
IBPS EPS before extraordinary items 0.610 (22.31) 
B Book value per share –0.003 (–0.33) 
LB Lagged one-year book value 0.008 (1.34) 
APRC Adjusted stock price (end March) 0.010 (2.71) 
LAPRC Lagged one-year adjusted price (end March) –0.018 (–5.79) 
Intercept 
 
0.209 (4.67) 
Adj. R2 
 
0.4235 
 Panel C: Earnings regressions using KLSS model 
RET Lagged one-year returns 0.0304 (4.17) 
CAF Change in EPS forecasted by analysts 0.7495 (21.28) 
Intercept 
 
–0.0154 (–4.06) 
Adj. R2 
 
0.377 
 Panel D: Earnings regressions using SO model 
IBTP Positive EPS 1.159 (21.05) 
NEGE Negative earnings indicator –0.541 (–10.66) 
ACP Positive accruals per share –0.148 (–7.08) 
ACN Negative accruals per share –0.177 (–8.41) 
AG Asset growth – percentage 0.001 (2.31) 
DD2 Indicator for non-dividend payer –0.097 (–7.11) 
DIV Dividends per share 0.329 (5.65) 
BM Book-to-market ratio –0.120 (–3.79) 
APRC Adjusted stock price (end December) –0.024 (–5.90) 
Intercept 
 
0.364 (9.40) 
Adj. R2   0.497   
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Table 4: Properties of earnings surprises and forecast errors (1985–2014) 
This presents summary statistics of earnings surprise that equal actual earnings minus earnings 
forecasts (scaled by the market capitalization of the previous period for the HDZ model and by the 
stock price of the previous period for the AF, RW, HW and SO models). The results are based on the 
sample of firm-year observations for which forecasts are available for all models. Panel A (B) shows 
the time-series averages of the means of the earnings surprises and of the AESs and their t-statistics 
when we include (exclude) winsorized earnings in the test. Panel C shows the statistical significance 
of the differences in absolute errors of alternative earnings forecasts presented in Panel B. Panel D 
shows the time-series averages of correlations of the alternative proxies of earnings surprises. 
Panel A: Including winsorized earnings 
 
AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
Mean ES –0.0215 0.0090 0.0116 –0.0056 –0.0036 0.0031 
t-stat (–4.26) (3.00) (0.77) (–0.63) (–0.98) (1.08) 
Mean AES 0.0391 0.0527 0.0933 0.0835 0.0405 0.0493 
SD 0.0046 0.0062 0.0194 0.0132 0.0055 0.0058 
No. 27903 27903 27903 27903 27903 27903 
Panel B: Excluding winsorized earnings 
 
AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
Mean ES –0.0146 0.0040 0.0110 –0.0030 –0.0015 0.0042 
t-stat (–5.14) (2.17) (0.94) (–0.44) (–0.41) (1.54) 
Mean AES 0.0297 0.0376 0.0824 0.072 0.0367 0.045 
SD 0.0026 0.0038 0.0160 0.0117 0.0052 0.0053 
No. 26506 26506 26506 26506 26506 26506 
Panel C: Differences between AESs observed in Panel B 
 
AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
RW –0.0079 
     t-stat (–4.08) 
     HDZ –0.0528 –0.0448 
    t-stat (–3.61) (–3.49) 
    HW –0.0424 –0.0344 0.0104 
   t-stat (–4.16) (–4.11) (2.16) 
   KLSS –0.0071 0.0009 0.0457 0.0353 
  t-stat (–2.03) (0.37) (3.60) (4.25) 
  SO –0.0153 –0.0074 0.0374 0.0270 –0.0083 
 t-stat (–3.81) (–3.05) (3.40) (3.97) (–2.34)   
Panel D: Correlations of earnings surprises across models   
 
AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
RW 0.612 
     HDZ 0.439 0.424 
    HW 0.426 0.425 0.645 
   KLSS 0.811 0.709 0.419 0.416 
  SO 0.354 0.427 0.402 0.497 0.364   
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Table 5: Earnings response coefficients (1985–2014) 
This presents ERCs associated with all proxies of earnings surprises and an analysis of the differences 
between them. These results are based on the 26,506 firm-year observations that are available for all 
models. Panel A illustrates the time-series averages of ERCs and their t-statistics obtained from the 
cross-sectional regression of annualized cumulative abnormal earnings announcement returns 
, 1( )j tACAR   on earnings surprise estimates , 1 , )(
rep f
j t j te e  : 
1 1, 1 , 1 , ) 0( , 1
rep f
j t j t j t
f
t taACAR e t TERC e u        .
 
Panel B shows the time-series averages of the differences between ERC estimates together with the 
corresponding t-statistics in parentheses. 
Panel A: ERCs 
Variable AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
ERCs 0.0317 0.0285 0.02 0.018 0.0339 0.0142 
t-stat (10.67) (13.50) (10.15) (7.06) (12.43) (10.59) 
Intercepts 0.0145 0.0053 0.0084 0.0092 0.0079 0.0072 
t-stat (4.66) (1.70) (3.77) (3.51) (3.20) (2.74) 
Adj. R2 0.0428 0.0351 0.0189 0.015 0.0493 0.0108 
N 26506 26506 26506 26506 26506 26506 
Panel B: Differences between ERC estimates       
 
AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
RW 0.0032 
     t-stat (2.15) 
     HDZ 0.0117 0.0084 
    t-stat (6.66) (5.27) 
    HW 0.0136 0.0104 0.002 
   t-stat (8.98) (5.47) (1.20) 
   KLSS –0.0022 –0.0055 –0.0139 –0.0159 
  t-stat (–1.57) (–3.61) (–7.76) (–7.83) 
  SO 0.0175 0.0142 0.0058 0.0038 0.0169 
 t-stat (8.70) (9.21) (3.27) (1.86) (7.19)   
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Table 6: Earnings response coefficients with control variables (1985–2014) 
This presents the time-series averages of ERCs and their t-statistics obtained from the cross-sectional 
regression of annualized cumulative abnormal earnings announcement returns (
, 1j tACAR  ) on 
earnings surprise estimates (
, 1 ,
rep f
j t j te e  ) and control variables including earnings volatility (E_vol), 
discretionary accruals (DA), leverage (Lev), market-to-book ratio (MB), beta, number of analysts’ 
forecasts (NEAF), negative earnings dummy (NEG), dividend paying dummy (DD1) and dividend 
pay-out ratios (DPR): 
, 1 1 , 1 , 1 1
1
, 1 , ) , 0,(  1
rep f
j t j t
j
f
j t t i t i t t
i
ACAR a ERC e contro u tle T   

      . 
Panel A: ERCs with control variables 
 
AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
ERC 0.0285 0.0253 0.0148 0.013 0.0306 0.0139 
t-stat (13.08) (12.66) (9.64) (8.05) (13.72) (8.76) 
E_vol 0.007 –0.0192 –0.0012 0.0005 0.0049 0.0016 
t-stat (0.22) (–0.56) (–0.04) (0.02) (0.16) (0.05) 
DA –0.0617 –0.0589 –0.0695 –0.0651 –0.0594 –0.0591 
t-stat (–3.00) (–2.80) (–3.17) (–2.92) (–3.09) (–2.77) 
Lev 0.0164 0.0107 0.0135 0.0109 0.0145 0.0132 
t-stat (3.26) (1.96) (2.57) (2.15) (2.89) (2.48) 
MB –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0005 –0.0004 –0.0003 –0.0004 
t-stat (–2.37) (–1.94) (–2.39) (–2.34) (–1.88) (–2.21) 
Beta –0.0013 0.0009 0.0002 –0.0005 0.0007 0.0002 
t-stat (–0.41) (0.25) (0.08) (–0.14) (0.22) (0.07) 
NEAF –0.0004 –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0002 –0.0004 –0.0002 
t-stat (–2.41) (–0.59) (–0.85) (–1.44) (–2.64) (–1.07) 
NEG –0.0383 –0.0485 –0.0517 –0.0536 –0.0396 –0.0628 
t-stat (–5.67) (–6.98) (–8.20) (–9.88) (–5.72) (–10.37) 
DD1 –0.0188 –0.0149 –0.0155 –0.0194 –0.0181 –0.0156 
t-stat (–5.41) (–4.62) (–4.92) (–5.64) (–5.36) (–4.47) 
DPR –0.002 –0.0022 –0.0024 –0.0027 –0.002 –0.0028 
t-stat (–2.27) (–2.58) (–2.41) (–2.45) (–2.30) (–2.68) 
Intercept 0.0347 0.0235 0.0269 0.0314 0.0268 0.0282 
t-stat (6.51) (4.88) (5.97) (6.20) (5.79) (5.57) 
Adj. R2 0.0731 0.0704 0.0529 0.0509 0.0787 0.0539 
N 25911 25911 25911 25911 25911 25911 
Panel B: Differences between ERC estimates      
 
AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
RW 0.0032 
     t-stat (2.13) 
     HDZ 0.0137 0.0105 
    t-stat (7.43) (5.82) 
    HW 0.0155 0.0124 0.0018 
   t-stat (11.39) (6.48) (1.11) 
   KLSS –0.0021 –0.0052 –0.0158 –0.0176 
  t-stat (–1.72) (–3.91) (–8.81) (–10.05) 
  SO 0.0146 0.0114 0.0009 –0.001 0.0166 
 t-stat (9.08) (7.82) (0.49) (–0.52) (8.82)   
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Table 7: Earnings surprise decomposition and earnings response coefficients (1985–2014) 
This presents the time-series averages of ERCs associated with the earnings surprise arising from 
analysts’ forecasts (
, 1 ,
rep a
j t j te e  ) and the model-based market’s expected correction for analysts’ 
errors, which equals the standardized earnings surprises of the model-based forecasts minus the 
standardized earnings surprises of analysts’ forecasts (
, ,
a f
j t j te e ) and the corresponding t-statistics 
from the regressions: 
0, 1 1 , 1 , 2 , ,, 11 ( ) ( ) u    0, 1
rep a a f
t j t j t j t j t tj tACAR e e e e t T           . 
  AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
1  0.0317 0.0386 0.0392 0.0367 0.0353 0.0385 
t-stat (10.67) (12.40) (9.62) (8.70) (12.49) (11.57) 
2  
 
0.0158 0.011 0.0075 0.0328 0.0084 
t-stat 
 
(8.73) (5.86) (3.40) (8.69) (8.40) 
Intercepts 0.0145 0.0110 0.0135 0.0144 0.0076 0.0137 
t-stat (4.66) (3.63) (4.91) (4.78) (3.56) (4.48) 
Adj. R2 0.0428 0.0525 0.0485 0.0467 0.0535 0.0474 
N 26506 26506 26506 26506 26506 26506 
1 – 2  
 
0.0228 0.0282 0.0292 0.0025 0.0301 
t-stat   (9.52) (12.81) (15.38) (0.71) (14.33) 
1 2 2( ) :      1.44:1 2.56:1 3.89:1 0.08:1 3.58:1 
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Table 8: Earnings surprise decomposition and earnings response coefficients with control 
variables (1985–2014) 
This presents the time-series averages of ERCs associated with the earnings surprise arising from 
analysts’ forecasts (
1
rep a
t te e  ), the expected market’s correction for analysts’ errors (
a f
t te e ) and 
control variables including earnings volatility (E_vol), discretionary accruals (DA), leverage (Lev), 
market-to-book ratio (MB), beta, number of analysts’ forecasts (NEAF), negative earnings dummy 
(NEG), dividend paying dummy (DD1) and dividend pay-out ratios (DPR): 
0 1 , 1 , 2 , , 1, 1 , 1
1
( ) ( ) u 0, 1rep a a fj t j
j
j t i i tt j t j t
i
tACAR controle e e e t T  

          . 
  AF RW HDZ HW KLSS SO 
1  0.0285 0.0352 0.0352 0.0328 0.0318 0.0357 
t-stat (13.08) (13.53) (11.60) (11.15) (14.79) (12.46) 
2  
 
0.0153 0.0084 0.0055 0.0315 0.009 
t-stat 
 
8.3534 4.5519 4.0411 7.9535 6.692 
E_vol 0.007 –0.0114 –0.0012 0.0025 0.0027 0.0015 
t-stat (0.22) (–0.32) (–0.04) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) 
DA –0.0617 –0.0625 –0.0718 –0.0673 –0.0589 –0.0667 
t-stat (–3.00) (–3.13) (–3.64) (–3.29) (–3.10) (–3.39) 
Lev 0.0164 0.0137 0.0166 0.0157 0.0148 0.0165 
t-stat (3.26) (2.62) (3.10) (3.12) (2.91) (3.15) 
MB –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0003 –0.0004 
t-stat (–2.37) (–2.23) (–2.38) (–2.35) (–1.79) (–2.29) 
Beta –0.0013 –0.0003 –0.0009 –0.0015 0.0007 –0.0011 
t-stat (–0.41) (–0.10) (–0.28) (–0.48) (0.21) (–0.32) 
NEAF –0.0004 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0004 –0.0004 –0.0004 
t-stat (–2.41) (–1.76) (–2.17) (–2.44) (–2.58) (–2.41) 
NEG –0.0383 –0.0361 –0.0336 –0.035 –0.0374 –0.0387 
t-stat (–5.67) (–4.96) (–4.89) (–5.48) (–5.32) (–5.60) 
DD1 –0.0188 –0.0162 –0.0169 –0.0189 –0.0179 –0.0169 
t-stat (–5.41) (–4.85) (–5.10) (–5.46) (–5.27) (–4.74) 
DPR –0.002 –0.0018 –0.0018 –0.002 –0.002 –0.0019 
t-stat (–2.27) (–2.33) (–2.12) (–2.19) (–2.28) (–2.28) 
Intercept 0.0347 0.0289 0.0316 0.0345 0.0262 0.0328 
t-stat (6.51) (5.86) (6.36) (6.39) (5.93) (6.08) 
Adj. R2 0.0731 0.0819 0.0768 0.0751 0.0822 0.0779 
N 25911 25911 25911 25911 25911 25911 
1 – 2    0.0199 0.0268 0.0272 0.0003 0.0267 
t-stat   (10.21) (14.16) (16.11) (0.07) (15.46) 
( 1 – 2 ): 2   1.30:1 3.19:1 4.96:1 0.01:1 2.97:1 
 
 
44 
 
Table 9: Abnormal returns and earnings forecast differences 
This shows the average abnormal returns for each decile of the differences between forecasts of the 
KLSS model and analysts as measured by the forward earnings yield forecasts. ACAR  denotes 
annualized cumulative abnormal earnings announcement returns, which equal the sum of four 
quarterly earnings announcement abnormal returns. EACAR  denotes excess abnormal returns, which 
equal annualized cumulative abnormal returns minus the mean of annualized cumulative abnormal 
returns ( )EACAR ACAR ACAR  . 
Decile portfolio No. KLSS ae e   ACAR EACAR 
D1 2650 –0.0768 0.0219 0.0133 
t-stat 
 
(–61.18) (5.92) (3.59) 
D2 2651 –0.0325 0.0114 0.0028 
t-stat 
 
(–330) (3.32) (0.82) 
D3 2650 –0.0202 0.0131 0.0045 
t-stat 
 
(–400) (3.91) (1.33) 
D4 2651 –0.0135 0.0082 –0.0004 
t-stat 
 
(–500.00) (2.33) (–0.11) 
D5 2651 –0.0096 0.0073 –0.0013 
t-stat 
 
(–510.00) (2.38) (–0.43) 
D6 2650 –0.0066 0.0073 –0.0013 
t-stat 
 
(–440) (2.43) (–0.42) 
D7 2651 –0.0038 0.0101 0.0015 
t-stat 
 
(–220) (3.33) (0.50) 
D8 2650 –0.0014 0.0042 –0.0044 
t-stat 
 
(–170) (1.41) (–1.48) 
D9 2651 0.0032 0.0003 –0.0083 
t-stat 
 
(59.45) (0.08) (–2.43) 
D10 2651 0.0800 0.0022 –0.0064 
t-stat   (28.06) (0.61) (–1.74) 
Mean 
 
–0.0081 0.0086 0 
t-stat   (–21.12) (8.16)   
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Table 10: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns 
This presents abnormal returns obtained from buying and holding stocks in the bottom (low) and the 
top (high) ten percentiles of the differences between earnings forecasts of the KLSS model and 
analysts each year from 1985 to 2014. Stocks are picked at the end of April each year based on the 
differences between forecasts of one-year-ahead earnings of the KLSS model (
KLSSe ) and analysts 
( )ae  and then buy and hold for different investment periods.  
Panel A: Portfolios for which KLSS forecasts are much more pessimistic ( )KLSS ae e  
  
Market model Fama–French five-factor model 
Year Size (1)a (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1985 45 0.038 0.122 0.217 0.098 0.028 0.095 0.155 0.088 
1986 46 0.008 0.025 0.167 0.263 0.012 0.040 0.169 0.303 
1987 42 0.053 0.094 0.107 0.086 0.050 0.095 0.116 0.035 
1988 42 0.003 0.020 0.016 0.034 0.005 0.023 0.004 –0.007 
1989 45 0.036 0.079 0.078 0.143 0.032 0.074 0.067 0.100 
1990 48 0.040 0.121 0.112 0.091 0.032 0.126 0.120 0.163 
1991 49 0.034 0.126 0.056 –0.100 0.028 0.123 0.036 –0.023 
1992 54 0.034 0.017 0.000 –0.298 0.025 0.014 0.003 –0.213 
1993 59 0.061 0.109 0.154 0.148 0.033 0.053 0.037 –0.295 
1994 65 0.022 0.016 0.048 –0.046 0.021 0.004 –0.031 –0.298 
1995 69 0.036 –0.045 –0.114 –0.242 0.034 –0.036 –0.110 –0.242 
1996 83 0.005 0.052 0.057 0.140 0.005 0.044 0.035 0.102 
1997 88 0.027 –0.003 –0.013 –0.202 0.014 –0.005 –0.016 –0.215 
1998 94 0.028 0.043 0.094 –0.008 0.034 0.006 0.008 –0.216 
1999 95 0.042 0.159 0.286 0.959 0.041 0.149 0.257 0.883 
2000 93 0.049 0.059 0.149 0.245 0.057 0.053 0.120 0.005 
2001 89 0.007 0.050 –0.001 –0.191 0.010 0.052 0.032 –0.153 
2002 95 0.018 0.030 0.051 –0.054 0.027 0.021 0.020 –0.127 
2003 105 0.102 0.259 0.488 0.542 0.100 0.256 0.516 0.619 
2004 109 0.049 0.159 0.214 0.398 0.022 0.087 0.121 0.279 
2005 108 –0.001 0.051 0.084 0.064 –0.003 0.058 0.071 0.096 
2006 109 0.028 0.060 0.130 0.245 0.036 0.090 0.157 0.290 
2007 111 0.026 0.055 0.043 0.042 0.032 0.037 –0.002 0.011 
2008 113 0.032 0.124 0.258 0.233 0.020 0.079 0.219 0.199 
2009 120 0.188 0.320 0.308 0.434 0.193 0.319 0.322 0.378 
2010 127 0.045 0.124 0.194 0.463 0.016 0.059 0.078 0.247 
2011 122 0.017 0.013 –0.025 –0.028 0.020 0.023 –0.026 –0.003 
2012 121 0.041 0.056 0.113 0.235 0.032 0.052 0.108 0.244 
2013 124 0.074 0.151 0.161 0.338 0.058 0.119 0.109 0.306 
2014 128 0.004 0.039 0.075 0.110 0.013 0.043 0.064 0.095 
Average 
 
0.038 0.083 0.117 0.138 0.034 0.072 0.092 0.088 
t-stat   (5.83) (5.95) (5.38) (2.91) (5.24) (5.40) (4.15) (1.82) 
Positive 
 
97% 93% 83% 70% 97% 93% 83% 63% 
Negative   3% 7% 17% 30% 3% 7% 17% 37% 
 
                                                          
a (1) one-month holding. (2) three-month holding. (3) six-month holding. (4) one-year holding. 
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Table 10: Buy-and-hold abnormal returns (Cont.) 
Panel B: Portfolios for which KLSS forecasts are more optimistic ( )KLSS ae e  
  
Market model Fama–French five-factor model 
Year Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1985 45 0.007 –0.078 –0.180 –0.500 –0.004 –0.092 –0.200 –0.501 
1986 46 –0.049 –0.123 –0.249 –0.640 –0.047 –0.120 –0.254 –0.644 
1987 42 –0.043 –0.115 –0.159 –0.450 –0.047 –0.117 –0.255 –0.551 
1988 41 –0.046 –0.140 –0.286 –0.588 –0.052 –0.141 –0.327 –0.764 
1989 44 –0.034 –0.092 –0.181 –0.449 –0.041 –0.104 –0.198 –0.496 
1990 47 –0.041 –0.150 –0.275 –1.113 –0.060 –0.153 –0.302 –1.036 
1991 50 –0.046 –0.170 –0.368 –1.349 –0.057 –0.201 –0.479 –1.715 
1992 53 –0.027 –0.146 –0.296 –1.099 –0.070 –0.198 –0.450 –1.612 
1993 58 –0.055 –0.131 –0.276 –0.562 –0.065 –0.163 –0.354 –1.150 
1994 65 –0.067 –0.135 –0.205 –0.504 –0.061 –0.151 –0.348 –1.114 
1995 69 –0.053 –0.130 –0.300 –0.636 –0.038 –0.108 –0.310 –0.900 
1996 82 –0.082 –0.169 –0.337 –0.860 –0.067 –0.204 –0.504 –1.629 
1997 88 0.006 –0.080 –0.273 –0.848 –0.004 –0.088 –0.256 –1.125 
1998 95 –0.026 0.001 –0.032 –0.495 –0.025 –0.109 –0.273 –1.099 
1999 96 –0.047 –0.102 –0.216 –0.967 –0.015 –0.070 –0.265 –1.168 
2000 93 –0.117 –0.311 –0.602 –2.816 –0.133 –0.380 –0.828 –3.537 
2001 89 –0.082 –0.046 –0.115 –0.355 –0.041 –0.045 –0.216 –0.497 
2002 96 –0.081 –0.185 –0.451 –1.331 –0.073 –0.208 –0.539 –1.840 
2003 105 –0.006 –0.078 –0.168 –0.388 0.047 0.031 0.022 –0.114 
2004 109 –0.056 –0.213 –0.516 –1.317 –0.044 –0.141 –0.423 –1.089 
2005 107 –0.001 –0.027 –0.039 –0.340 –0.003 0.001 –0.047 –0.202 
2006 109 –0.046 –0.197 –0.463 –1.175 –0.036 –0.163 –0.413 –1.096 
2007 111 –0.022 –0.077 –0.168 –0.303 –0.023 –0.092 –0.203 –0.381 
2008 113 –0.013 –0.122 –0.489 –1.530 0.007 –0.067 –0.405 –1.307 
2009 120 –0.072 –0.154 –0.414 –0.799 –0.034 –0.091 –0.310 –0.707 
2010 127 –0.019 –0.151 –0.449 –1.376 –0.002 –0.103 –0.340 –1.121 
2011 121 –0.007 –0.057 –0.154 –0.506 –0.008 –0.056 –0.176 –0.504 
2012 121 –0.008 –0.094 –0.283 –0.720 –0.028 –0.100 –0.245 –0.633 
2013 125 –0.038 –0.114 –0.319 –0.836 –0.039 –0.128 –0.299 –0.758 
2014 127 –0.057 –0.171 –0.311 –0.404 –0.058 –0.191 –0.426 –0.584 
Average 
 
–0.041 –0.125 –0.286 –0.842 –0.037 –0.125 –0.321 –0.996 
t-stat 
 
(–7.65) (–11.23) (–11.29) (–8.87) (–6.27) (–9.15) (–11.20) (–8.38) 
Positive 
 
7% 3% 0% 0% 7% 7% 3% 0% 
Negative 
 
93% 97% 100% 100% 93% 93% 97% 100% 
 
 
